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Cognitive Interference Channels with Confidential Messages
Yingbin Liang, Anelia Somekh-Baruch, H. Vincent Poor,
Shlomo Shamai (Shitz), and Sergio Verdu´
Abstract— The cognitive interference channel with confiden-
tial messages is studied. Similarly to the classical two-user
interference channel, the cognitive interference channel consists
of two transmitters whose signals interfere at the two receivers.
It is assumed that there is a common message source (message
1) known to both transmitters, and an additional independent
message source (message 2) known only to the cognitive
transmitter (transmitter 2). The cognitive receiver (receiver
2) needs to decode both messages, while the non-cognitive
receiver (receiver 1) should decode only the common message.
Furthermore, message 2 is assumed to be a confidential message
which needs to be kept as secret as possible from receiver 1,
which is viewed as an eavesdropper with regard to message
2. The level of secrecy is measured by the equivocation rate.
A single-letter expression for the capacity-equivocation region
of the discrete memoryless cognitive interference channel is
established and is further explicitly derived for the Gaussian
case. Moreover, particularizing the capacity-equivocation region
to the case without a secrecy constraint, establishes a new
capacity theorem for a class of interference channels, by
providing a converse theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interference channels model basic wireless networks, in
which communication signals intended for one receiver cause
interference at other receivers. Although the capacity region
and the best coding schemes for the interference channel
remain unknown, much progress has been made toward un-
derstanding this channel (see, e.g., [1]–[6] and the references
therein).
Interference not only affects communication rates, but also
raises security issues. This is because information on the
original source can be extracted by other nodes that are not
the intended destination (eavesdroppers) due to interference
at these nodes. In certain situations it is desirable to minimize
the leak of information to eavesdroppers. It is also important
to evaluate the secrecy level of confidential information
(which was defined in [7] as the equivocation rate for the
single-user wire-tap channel) for the interference channel,
and to study the reliable communication rates under a given
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certain level of secrecy constraint. This is what motivates the
problem that we address in this paper.
We study the cognitive interference channel, with two
transmitters and two receivers (see Fig. 1). Transmitter 1
knows only message 1, and transmitter 2 (the cognitive
transmitter) knows both messages 1 and 2. Receiver 1 needs
to decode only message 1 and receiver 2 needs to decode
both messages 1 and 2. Furthermore, we also address a
secrecy constraint, and assume that transmitter 2 wishes to
protect message 2 (confidential message) from being known
by receiver 1 (an eavesdropper) due to interference. We
refer to this model as the cognitive interference channel with
confidential messages.
The channel studied in this paper can model a cognitive
radio (see [8]–[11]), which is a device that is introduced to
wireless networks in order to improve overall performance
by utilizing unused spectral resources. In the model we study,
the cognitive radio is modelled by transmitter 2 which helps
transmitter 1 (the primary transmitter) transmit its message.
Moreover, the cognitive transmitter also transmits its own
message, which should be kept confidential with respect to
the non-cognitive receiver (receiver 1).
In this paper, we establish the capacity-equivocation re-
gion for the cognitive interference channel with confidential
messages, which characterizes the trade-off between the
achievable communication rates and the secrecy levels at the
eavesdropper. We further derive the capacity-equivocation
region for the Gaussian case. For the case without the secrecy
constraint, the capacity-equivocation region reduces to the
capacity region of the cognitive interference channel. This
establishes a new capacity theorem for a class of interference
channels, by providing a converse theorem.
We note that the cognitive interference channel (without
secrecy constraints) was studied in [12, Theorem 5], where
an achievable rate region (inner bound on the capacity re-
gion) is given. An achievable error exponent for this channel
was studied in [13]. In this paper, we provide an outer bound
on the capacity region that matches the inner bound given
in [12, Theorem 5] and hence establish the capacity region
for this channel. We also note that the channel we study is
different from the channel model studied in [10], [11], [14],
[15] in that receiver 2 is required to decode both messages
1 and 2. Furthermore, we also address the secrecy constraint
which was not considered in [10]–[15]. We finally note
that the model we study is different from the interference
channel model with secrecy constraints studied in [16], in
that it assumes a cognitive transmitter that knows the other
transmitter’s message and a cognitive receiver that decodes
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Fig. 1. Cognitive interference channel with confidential messages
both messages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
introduce the model of the cognitive interference channel
with confidential messages. Section III presents the capacity-
equivocation region, and Section IV applies our results to
the Gaussian case. Section V particularizes our results to the
cognitive interference channel without secrecy constraints.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
Definition 1: A discrete memoryless cognitive interfer-
ence channel consists of two finite channel input alphabets
X1 and X2, two finite channel output alphabets Y and Z ,
and a transition probability distribution p(y, z|x1, x2) (see
Fig. 1), where x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2 are channel inputs from
transmitters 1 and 2, respectively, and y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z are
channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
Over this channel, transmitters 1 and 2 jointly send one
message denoted by W1 to receivers 1 and 2, and transmitter
2 sends one message denoted by W2 to receiver 2 and wants
to keep this message as secret as possible from receiver 1.
Hence the message W2 is referred to the confidential message
with respect to receiver 1.
Definition 2: A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code for the cognitive
interference channel consists of the following:
• Two message sets: Wk = {1, 2, . . . , 2nRk} for k = 1, 2;
• Two messages: W1 and W2 are independent random
variables that are uniformly distributed over W1 and W2,
respectively;
• Two encoders: one deterministic encoder f1:W1 → Xn1 ,
which maps each message w1 ∈ W1 to a codeword xn1 ∈
Xn1 ; and one stochastic encoder1 f2: W1 ×W2 → Xn2 ,
which maps each message pair (w1, w2) ∈ W1 ×W2 to
a codeword xn2 ∈ Xn2 ;
• Two decoders: one is g1: Yn → W1, which maps a
received sequence yn to a message wˆ(1)1 ∈ W1; and the
other is g2: Zn → W1 × W2, which maps a received
sequence zn to a message pair (wˆ(2)1 , w2) ∈ W1 ×W2.
1We note that the stochastic encoder f2 defines a transition probability
distribution f2(xn2 |w1, w2). In fact, f2 can be equivalently represented by a
deterministic mapping W1 ×W2 × T → Xn2 , which maps (w1, w2, t) ∈
W1 × W2 × T to a codeword xn2 ∈ Xn2 , where t is a realization of a
randomizing variable T that is independent of (W1,W2). The distribution
of T is part of the encoding strategy of transmitter 2. We assume this
distribution is known at both receivers, but the realization of T is not known
at either receiver.
For a given code, we define the probability of error and the
secrecy level of the confidential message W2. The probability
of error when the message pair (w1, w2) is sent is defined
as
P (n)e (w1, w2) = Pr
{
(wˆ
(1)
1 , wˆ
(2)
1 , wˆ2) 6= (w1, w1, w2)
}
(1)
and the average block probability of error is
P (n)e =
1
2n(R1+R2)
2nR1∑
w1=1
2nR2∑
w2=1
P (n)e (w1, w2). (2)
The secrecy level of the message W2 at receiver 1 is
defined by
R
(n)
2e =
1
n
H(W2|Y n). (3)
A rate-equivocation triple (R1, R2, R2e) is said to be
achievable if there exists a sequence of
(
2nR1 , 2nR2 , n
)
codes for n ≥ 1 with the average error probability
P (n)e → 0
as n→∞ and with the equivocation rate, R2e, satisfying
R2e ≤ lim inf
n→∞
R
(n)
2e .
Definition 3: The capacity-equivocation region C is the
closure of the union of all achievable rate-equivocation
triples (R1, R2, R2e).
Definition 4: The secrecy capacity region, Cs, is defined
by
Cs = {(R1, R2) : (R1, R2, R2) ∈ C } , (4)
that is, the region that includes all achievable rate-pairs
(R1, R2) such that perfect secrecy is achieved for the mes-
sage W2.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We first provide an achievable rate-equivocation region for
the cognitive interference channel in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The following region is achievable for the
cognitive interference channel with confidential messages:
R =
⋃
p(u, x1)p(x2|u, x1)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2, R2e) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2e ≥ 0, R21 ≥ 0, R22 ≥ 0
R2 = R21 +R22
R1 +R21 ≤ I(U,X1;Y )
R22 ≤ I(X2;Z|U,X1)
R21 +R22 ≤ I(U,X2;Z|X1)
R1 +R21 +R22 ≤ I(U,X1, X2;Z)
R2e ≤ R22
R2e ≤ I(X2;Z|U,X1)− I(X2;Y |U,X1)
R21 +R2e ≤ I(U,X2;Z|X1)− I(X2;Y |U,X1)
R1 +R21 +R2e ≤ I(U,X1, X2;Z)− I(X2;Y |U,X1)


(5)
Proof: (outline) We briefly outline the idea of the
achievable scheme in the following. The details of the proof
and the computation of the equivocation rate are omitted
and can be found in [17]. The message W2 is split into
two components, W21 and W22, with rates indicated by R21
and R22, respectively, in (5). Receiver 1 decodes both W1
and W21, and receiver 2 decodes W1, W21 and W22. Since
W21 is decoded and fully known at receiver 1, W21 does
not contribute to the secrecy level of W2 at receiver 1 (the
eavesdropper). Hence, only W22 may be hidden from the
eavesdropper.
We now present our main result in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the cognitive interference channel with
confidential messages, the capacity-equivocation region is
given by
C =
⋃
p(u, x1, v)p(x2|v)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2, R2e) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2e ≥ 0
R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Y )
R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Z|X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
+I(V ;Z|U,X1)
R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ I(V ;Z|U,X1)− I(V ;Y |U,X1)
R1 +R2,e ≤ I(U, V,X1;Z)− I(V ;Y |U,X1)


(6)
Proof: (outline) To establish the achievability part of
Theorem 1, we first note that if we define a random variable
V that satisfies the Markov chain condition (X1, U)↔ V ↔
X2, and change X2 to be V in R given in Lemma 1, the
resulting region is also achievable. This follows by prefixing
one discrete memoryless channel with the input V and the
transition probability p(x2|v) to transmitter 2 (similarly to
[18, Lemma 4]). For this new achievable region, we apply
Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see, e.g., [19]) to eliminate R21
and R22 from the bounds and then obtain the region C in
Theorem 1.
The proof of the converse part of Theorem 1 is omitted
and can be found in [17].
The capacity-equivocation region provided in Theorem 1
in (6) can also be written in the following equivalent form.
Corollary 1: The following region is equivalent to the
region in Theorem 1 in (6) and provides a simpler form of the
capacity-equivocation region for the cognitive interference
channel with confidential messages:
C =
⋃
p(u, x1, v)p(x2|v)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2, R2e) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2e ≥ 0
R1 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Z|X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
+I(V ;Z|U,X1)
R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ I(V ;Z|U,X1)− I(V ;Y |U,X1)


(7)
Remark 1: The capacity-equivocation region of the cog-
nitive interference channel with confidential messages given
in (7) reduces to the capacity-equivocation region of the
broadcast channel with confidential messages given in [18,
Theorem 1] when setting X1 = φ.
For the case of perfect secrecy, we obtain the following
secrecy capacity region based on Corollary 1.
Corollary 2: The secrecy capacity region of the cognitive
interference channel with confidential messages is given by:
Cs =
⋃
p(u, x1, v)p(x2|v)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
R2 ≤ I(V ;Z|U,X1)− I(V ;Y |U,X1)


(8)
We next present the capacity-equivocation region for two
classes of degraded cognitive interference channels, which
will be useful when we study the Gaussian case.
Corollary 3: If the cognitive interference channel satisfies
the following degradedness condition
p(y, z|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2)p(z|y, x1), (9)
then the capacity-equivocation region is given by
Cdeg1 =
⋃
p(x1, x2)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2, 0) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R2 ≤ I(X2;Z|X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(X1, X2;Y ), I(X1, X2;Z)}


(10)
Proof: (outline) The achievability follows from (6) given
in Theorem 1 by setting U = V = X2. The proof of the
converse part is omitted and can be found in [17].
Corollary 4: If the cognitive interference channel satisfies
the following degradedness condition
p(y, z|x1, x2) = p(z|x1, x2)p(y|z, x1), (11)
then the capacity-equivocation region is given by
Cdeg2 =
⋃
p(u, x1, x2)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2, R2e) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2,e ≥ 0
R1 ≤ min {I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
R2 ≤ I(X2;Z|U,X1)
R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ I(X2;Z|U,X1)− I(X2;Y |U,X1)


(12)
Proof: (outline) The achievability follows from (7) by
setting V = X2 and observing that the sum-rate bound in
(7) is equal to the sum of the two bounds on the individual
rates in (12) and that I(X2;Z|U,X1) ≤ I(U,X2;Z|X1).
The proof of the converse part is omitted and can be found
in [17].
Corollary 3, (and similarly, Corollary 4) continues to hold
also for a stochastically degraded channel, i.e., a chan-
nel p(y, z|x1, x2) whose conditional marginal distributions
p(y|x1, x2) and p(z|x1, x2) are the same as those of a
channel satisfying the degradedness condition (9) (and cor-
respondingly (11) for Corollary 4).
We note that while achieving the capacity-equivocation
region for the general cognitive interference channel with
confidential messages requires application of a rate splitting
scheme (described in the proof for Lemma 1), it is unneces-
sary in the degraded channel cases (11), (9).
IV. GAUSSIAN COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, we consider the Gaussian cognitive inter-
ference channel. The channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2 at
time instant i are given, respectively, by
Yi = X1,i + aX2,i +N1,i
Zi = bX1,i +X2,i +N2,i
(13)
where {N1,i}∞i=1 and {N2,i}∞i=1 are independent i.i.d. Gaus-
sian processes, and a and b are real constants. Without loss
of generality, we set V ar(N1,i) = V ar(N2,i) = 1. We
assume that the transmitters are subject to the following
power constraints
1
n
n∑
i=1
X21,i ≤ P1 and
1
n
n∑
i=1
X22,i ≤ P2. (14)
We consider the cases with |a| ≥ 1 and |a| < 1, separately.
For the case when |a| ≥ 1, we have the following theorem
on the capacity-equivocation region.
Theorem 2: For the Gaussian cognitive interference chan-
nel with confidential messages, if |a| ≥ 1, then the capacity-
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equivocation region is given by
C =
⋃
−1≤ρ≤1

(R1, R2, 0) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R2 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + (1− ρ2)P2
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + b2P1 + P2 + 2bρ
√
P1P2
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P1 + a
2P2 + 2aρ
√
P1P2
)


(15)
From Theorem 2, we observe that no secrecy can be
achieved whenever |a| ≥ 1, i.e., R2e = 0. This is because
when |a| ≥ 1 and X1 is given, receiver 2’s output Z is
degraded with regard to receiver 1’s output Y , and hence
receiver 1 can obtain any information that receiver 2 obtains.
Proof: (outline) The achievability follows from (10)
given in Corollary 3 by computing the mutual information
terms with (X1, X2) that are zero-mean jointly Gaussian
with E[X21 ] = P1, E[X22 ] = P2, and E[X1X2] = ρ
√
P1P2.
The converse follows by applying the bounds in the
converse proof for Theorem 1 (see [17]) to the Gaussian
case. The power constraints (14) translate to upper bounds
on the second moments of X1 and X2, i.e., V ar(X1) ≤ P1
and V ar(X2) ≤ P2. The proof also applies the degradedness
property in this case, i.e., Z is degraded with regard to Y if
X1 is given. The details of the proof are omitted and can be
found in [17].
In Figure 2, the capacity region of the Gaussian cognitive
interference channel is shown for P1 = P2 = 1, b = 3,
and a = 1, 2, 3. In fact, in this case, the capacity region
is the same for all a ≥ 3 as one can see in (15). This is
because for the chosen parameters P1 = P2 = 1 and b = 3,
if a ≥ 3, receiver 1 always decodes W1 if receiver 2 decodes
this message. Hence receiver 2 is the bottleneck receiver.
We now show the capacity-equivocation region when |a| <
1.
Theorem 3: For the Gaussian cognitive interference chan-
nel with confidential messages, if |a| < 1, the capacity-
equivocation region is given by
C =
⋃
−1≤ρ≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2, R2e) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R2,e ≥ 0
R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P1+ρ
2a2P2+2ρa
√
βP1P2
1+(1−ρ2)a2P2
)
R1 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + b
2P1+ρ
2P2+2ρb
√
βP1P2
1+(1−ρ2)P2
)
R2 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + (1− ρ2)P2
)
0 ≤ R2e ≤ R2
R2e ≤ 12 log
(
1 + (1 − ρ2)P2
)
− 12 log
(
1 + (1− ρ2)a2P2
)


(16)
We note that the equivocation rate in this case can be
positive. This is because when |a| < 1, receiver 1’s output
Y is degraded with regard to receiver 2’s output Z if X1
is given. Hence receiver 2 may be able to receive some
information that receiver 1 cannot obtain. Note also, in (16),
if a > 0, b > 0, then β = 1.
Proof: (outline) The achievability follows from (12)
given in Corollary 4 by setting V = X2 and computing
the mutual information terms with (U,X1, X2) having the
following joint distribution:
X1 ∼ N (0, P1), U = ρ
√
βP2
P1
+ U ′, and X2 = U +X ′2
(17)
where U ′ ∼ N (0, β¯ρ2P2) and X ′2 ∼ N (0, (1− ρ2)P2), and
X1, U
′, X ′2 are independent.
The converse follows by applying the bounds in the
converse proof for Corollary 4 (see [17]) to the Gaussian
case and applying the entropy power inequality. The proof
also applies the degradedness property in this case, i.e., Y is
degraded with regard to Z if X1 is given. The details of the
proof are omitted in this paper and can be found in [17].
In Figure 3 the capacity region and the secrecy capacity
region of the Gaussian cognitive interference channel are
shown for P1 = P2 = 1, b = 1 and a = 0.5, 0.8 and
1. It can be seen that as a increases, receiver 1 decodes
more information about W2 via rate splitting. While this
helps receiver 1 improve R1 by interference cancellation,
it causes the equivocation rate R2e to decrease due to more
leakage of W2 to receiver 1. When a = 1, receiver 1 decodes
everything that receiver 2 decodes, and hence R2e = 0,
which is consistent with Theorem 2.
V. IMPLICATION TO COGNITIVE INTERFERENCE
CHANNELS
Sections III and IV study the cognitive interference chan-
nel with confidential messages. If we do not consider the
secrecy constraint, i.e., message W2 need not be confi-
dential from receiver 1, the capacity-equivocation region
given in Theorem 1 reduces to the capacity region of the
corresponding cognitive interference channel without secrecy
constraints.
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Theorem 4: The capacity region of the cognitive interfer-
ence channel is given by
C =
⋃
p(u, x1, x2)p(y, z|x1, x2)

(R1, R2) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Y )
R2 ≤ I(X2;Z|X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
+I(X2;Z|U,X1)


.
(18)
Proof: (outline) From Corollary 1, we deduce that the
capacity region of the cognitive interference channel is given
by (18) with an additional bound R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Z). This is
done by setting R2e = 0 and because the remaining bounds
do not decrease if one sets V = X2 due to the Markov chain
relationship V ↔ (X1, X2)↔ (Y, Z). We further show that
the bound R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Z) is, in fact, redundant.
We note that the region (18) was given as an achievable
rate region (inner bound on the capacity region) in [12,
Theorem 5]. The converse proof [17] that we have given
to show the more general result of Theorem 1 provides a
converse to establish that the region (18) is, in fact, the
capacity region.
We note that another achievable region for the cognitive in-
terference channel (without secrecy constraints) was reported
in [13], which is included within the larger achievable region
in [12, Theorem 5].
The cognitive interference channel includes a few classical
channels as special cases.
Remark 2: The cognitive interference channel reduces to
the broadcast channel with degraded message sets studied in
[20] if we set X1 = φ. Under this condition, it is easy to
see that the capacity region of cognitive interference channel
given in Theorem 4 reduces to the capacity region of the
broadcast channel with degraded message sets given in [18,
p. 360, Theorem 4.1] that was shown to be equivalent to the
capacity region given in [20].
Remark 3: The capacity region of the cognitive interfer-
ence channel reduces to the capacity region of the multiple
access channel with degraded message sets given in [21] (see
also [22]) if we set Y = Z . In this case, the region given in
(18) becomes
C =
⋃
p(u, x1, x2)
p(z|x1, x2)


(R1, R2) :
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ I(U,X1;Z)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Z|X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Z)


(19)
It is easy to see that the preceding region is maximized by
setting U = X2, and hence the first bound is not necessary.
The resulting region is the capacity region of the multiple
access channel with degraded message sets given in [21] (see
also [22]).
Corollary 5: By setting R2e = 0, Theorems 2 and 3
respectively reduce to the capacity regions in the cases |a| ≥
1 and |a| < 1 for the Gaussian cognitive interference channel
without secrecy constraints, where the cognitive receiver is
required to reliably decode both messages.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a single-letter charac-
terization for the capacity-equivocation region of the cog-
nitive interference channel with confidential messages. The
capacity-achieving random scheme is based on superposition
coding, rate-splitting and stochastic encoding. We have fur-
ther specialized the expression for the capacity-equivocation
region to several cases: (a) perfect secrecy, that is, the
secrecy-capacity region; (b) no secrecy constraints, i.e., a
new capacity theorem for the cognitive interference channel;
(c) degraded channel in which given the first channel input,
the observation available to the receiver that decodes both
messages is a degraded version of the observation available
to the eavesdropping receiver; and (d) degraded channel in
which given the first channel input, the observation available
to the eavesdropping receiver is a degraded version of the
observation available to the other receiver. We have further
applied the results to the Gaussian cognitive interference
channel with confidential messages, which falls under cases
(c) or (d), and have explicitly characterized the capacity-
equivocation region in closed form expressions.
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